As Maloney (2010) points out, the tight sanctions are not putting the U.S. In a good position to negotiate, so there must be some path to victory under realist philosophy that involves escalating a conflict position with Iran. There is also the possibility that the conflict is inevitable, and the United States is hoping to stall Iran long enough to find a way around conflict.
This paper will investigate the sanctions from the realist perspective. The hypothesis is that the sanctions do fulfill a realist path to success, but they are not capable to achieving this end on their own. The sanctions must, therefore, be working in concert with other elements of strategy. The topic is important because the situation in Iran is ongoing, and poses a risk to global security and stability. If the course of engagement that the U.S. is on with Iran is the wrong one, then the results could be profoundly negative. Studying the tactic of sanctions from a particular perspective gives us insight as to what the approach to Iran might be going forward, so the study is of critical importance to furthering...
(2013). Political realism in international relations. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 29, 2013 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-international-relations/
Maloney, S. (2012). Obama's counterproductive new Iran sanctions. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved April 29, 2013 from http://www.relooney.info/0_New_12624.pdf
O'Sullivan, M. (2010). Iran and the great sanctions debate. Washington Quarterly. October 2010.
The Economist (2013). How Iranian companies manage to keep trading with foreigners. The Economist. Retrieved April 29, 2013 from http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574540-how-iranian-companies-manage-keep-trading-foreigners-around-block
US Department of State. (2013). Iran sanctions. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved April 29, 2013 from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm
Van Kemenade, W. (2010). China vs. The Western campaign for Iran sanctions. The Washington Quarterly. July 2010.
